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COMMENT 
OUR ANTITOTALITARIAN CONSTITUTION                      
AND THE RIGHT TO IDENTITY 
BRIAN T. RUOCCO† 
Underlying the United States Constitution is an antitotalitarian principle—i.e., the 
government cannot define, regulate, or compel aspects of life that are fundamental to 
identity and personhood. Prohibitions of compulsory childbirth, flag salutes, ideological 
education, and racial separation most clearly evince this bulwark against totalitarianism.  
Nonetheless, from birth, the government enforces legal gender, restricts the 
availability of legal gender reclassification, and prevents individuals from removing 
themselves from the legal gender system. The government thus affirmatively produces 
and compels identity on an individual level. Moreover, for trans* people, these laws 
cause expressive and dignitary harm, increase exposure to violence, and diminish life 
opportunities. Although these gender identity laws constitute a totalitarian occupation 
of individual lives, they have evaded constitutional scrutiny. 
This Comment (1) evaluates the right to identity situated in the midst of the 
Constitution’s proscription of totalitarianism and (2) investigates constitutional 
arguments supporting trans* people’s right to self-determine their gender identity. 
Specifically, this context illuminates the right to identity and how the government 
engages in compulsory, affirmative identity formation. Ultimately, this Comment 
demonstrates that for trans* people and our Constitution alike, we must eliminate 
totalitarian gender identity laws and totalitarianism in all forms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Our Constitution proscribes totalitarian government. Under the letter 
and spirit of the Constitution, the United States government cannot define, 
regulate, or compel aspects of life that are fundamental to identity and 
personhood. It cannot occupy our lives or enforce conformity and subservience 
to the State in the way a totalitarian government would. 
Certain freedoms serve as a bulwark against government-compelled identity 
and conformity. Those freedoms protect us from government attempts to 
submerge the individual beneath the State. For example, the government cannot 
force women to bear children and take on motherhood,1 compel children to salute 
 
1 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it 
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”); 
see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 782, 788-90 (1989) (suggesting 
that women may abort their pregnancies “so that they may avoid being forced into an identity” and 
explaining that anti-abortion laws impermissibly “exert power productively over a woman’s body and . . . 
forcefully reshape and redirect her life”). 
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the flag,2 or compel veterans to swear allegiance to the government.3 It cannot 
prevent adults from marrying individuals of the opposite race or same gender.4 
The seminal 1923 case Meyer v. Nebraska evinces this proscription against 
totalitarianism. Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty, the 
Supreme Court struck down a Nebraska law prohibiting the teaching of 
modern languages like German, French, Spanish, and Italian in schools prior 
to the completion of eighth grade,5 even though the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not address a right to language or schooling.6 Rather, the dispositive 
liberty interest in Meyer was freedom from totalitarian government. While 
“Sparta assembled the males at [age] seven into barracks and intrusted their 
subsequent education and training to official guardians” to “submerge the 
individual and develop ideal citizens,” and Plato envisioned the State 
communally raising the children of the guardians, our Constitution would not 
allow such institutions.7 As Justice McReynolds wrote, 
Although [the] measures [of Sparta and Plato] have been deliberately 
approved by men of great genius, their ideas touching the relation between 
individual and State were wholly different from those upon which our 
institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any legislature could 
impose such restrictions upon the people of a State without doing violence 
to both [the] letter and spirit of the Constitution.8 
The Meyer Court did not focus on what the Nebraska law prohibited. 
Rather, the Court focused on the law’s affirmative work—its attempt to 
produce and compel uniformity of thought and identity. Thus, to determine 
whether governmental action violates the Constitution’s proscription against 
totalitarianism, courts must evaluate not “what is being prohibited, but what is 
 
2 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that compulsory 
flag salutes “transcend[] constitutional limitations on [government] power and invade[] the sphere 
of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve 
from all official control”). 
3 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 514-15, 529 (1958) (barring the government from 
conditioning veterans’ tax exemptions on swearing allegiance to the United States). 
4 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“Under the Constitution, same-sex 
couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage 
their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
1, 12 (1967) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment “requires that the freedom of choice to marry 
not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations” and that “[u]nder our Constitution, the 
freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be 
infringed by the State”). 
5 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401, 403 (1923). 
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (neglecting to provide an explicit right to schooling, an 
explicit right to learn a particular language, and an explicit right to preserve one’s native language). 
7 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-02. 
8 Id. at 402. 
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being produced” and “the real effects that conformity with the law produces at 
the level of everyday lives and social practices.”9 The proscription against 
totalitarianism prohibits restrictions on liberty that produce conformity with 
respect to individual lives. Essentially, any law that produces a relation 
between the individual and the State that evinces impermissible government 
control over individuals is totalitarian and does violence to the letter and 
spirit of the Constitution. 
The proscription against totalitarianism prohibits government occupation 
of individual lives. It does not, of course, bar all government restrictions on 
liberty. The government may forbid or circumscribe some acts and liberties, 
such as murder or drug use.10 The antitotalitarian principle respects “the 
balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of 
the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized 
society.”11 Accordingly, even in an antitotalitarian regime, laws may interject 
some norms and practices that affirmatively shape our lives and help sustain 
order. There is not an unlimited, unburdened right to define oneself. Rather, 
the antitotalitarian principle “prevent[s] the state from taking over, or taking 
undue advantage of, those processes by which individuals are defined.”12 
One way the government affirmatively produces identity and conformity 
is by documenting and enforcing legal gender. When a baby is born, the baby 
is assigned “male” or “female” identity based on genital appearance. This 
“male” or “female” identity is recorded on a birth certificate, becomes the 
baby’s legal gender, and helps structure the individual’s life. This identity 
affects how the individual navigates sex-segregated facilities, legal documentation, 
gendered expectations, and interactions with state and nonstate entities.13 
For most people, this assigned legal gender will raise little to no concern 
because most people identify with their assigned legal gender. Nevertheless, 
“[t]he proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is 
a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”14 In the context 
 
9 Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 783. 
10 Cf. id. at 784 (differentiating laws that “take over the lives of the persons involved” from those 
that remove a single act or liberty). 
11 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
12 Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 794. 
13 See Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731,  737, 752-53 (2008) (describing 
how legal gender affects trans* people’s interactions with sex-segregated facilities like homeless 
shelters and increases their exposure to discrimination in contexts where one must present 
identification, such as interactions with police or during the employment application process). 
14 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992); see also id. (stating that 
although legislation requiring spousal notification before obtaining an abortion may only negatively 
restrict one percent of women who obtain abortions, “[l]egislation is measured for consistency with 
the Constitution by its impact on those whose conduct it affects”). 
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of legal gender, trans*15 people are the ones who find themselves most 
encumbered. Specifically, trans* people who do not identify with their legal 
gender experience intense expressive and dignitary harm and are often 
subjected to violence, harassment, and assault when they present incongruent 
legal documents.16 For those who wish to reclassify their legal gender, a 
complex legal matrix awaits.17 Therefore, trans* people are the proper focus 
of the constitutional inquiry regarding legal gender identity. 
The imposition of gender identity on trans* people inverts the typical 
relationship between the individual and the State. Typically, the Constitution 
allows individuals to self-regulate and self-govern regarding matters of 
personhood and identity; the government restricts certain liberties to promote 
ordered liberty and justice,18 but does not impose identity. Ultimately, the 
Constitution proscribes the government’s totalitarian enforcement of gender 
identity on trans* people. Therefore, for both trans* people and the Constitution, 
we must eliminate these totalitarian gender identity laws. 
Thus, this Comment seeks to (1) evaluate the constitutional right to 
identity situated in the Constitution’s proscription against totalitarianism 
and (2) investigate constitutional arguments for the right of trans* people to 
self-determine their gender identity. This context illuminates the right to 
identity and how the government engages in compulsory, affirmative 
identity formation. 
Part I of this Comment addresses (1) legal gender and how it is documented, 
(2) how trans* people are (or are not) afforded the opportunity to self-define 
their legal gender, and (3) how the government impermissibly appropriates 
trans* people’s gender identities to buttress normative conceptions of sex and 
gender. Part II analyzes the Constitution’s proscription against totalitarianism 
and the constitutional right to identity in both substantive due process and 
First Amendment jurisprudence. Part III evaluates how trans* people can situate 
gender identity claims within a constitutional framework of antitotalitarianism and 
 
15 The term trans* (with an asterisk) refers to a diverse group of individuals who may identify as 
transgender, genderqueer, genderfluid, nonbinary, genderf*ck, genderless, third gender, two-spirit, 
bigender, or gender nonconforming. The use of trans* underscores that this analysis includes all individuals 
who have a self-determined identity in conflict with the traditional, cisgendered male–female binary. See 
Hugh Ryan, What Does Trans* Mean, and Where Did It Come From?, SLATE: OUTWARD (Jan. 10, 2014, 
12:37 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/01/10/trans_what_does_it_mean_and_where_did_it
_come_from.html [https://perma.cc/BJL4-F2MT] (“[T]he * is used metaphorically to capture all the 
identities—from drag queen to genderqueer—that fall outside traditional gender norms.”). When “trans,” 
“transgender,” or another label is used in this Comment, it is generally due to a cited author’s use of the 
term or an individual’s self-identification. This distinction is complicated by the fact that many authors use 
a definition of “trans” or “transgender” that includes most trans* people. 
16 See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 31–39 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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the right to identity. Finally, Part IV evaluates how the government can eliminate 
unconstitutional violations of trans* people’s rights. 
I. TRANS* PEOPLE AND GENDER IDENTITY 
A. Legal Gender and Legal Gender Documentation 
Although legal gender is ubiquitous in the United States, people whose 
gender identity matches their legal gender may be unaware of the insidious 
ways that legal gender affects trans* people.19 Gender is at the core of identity 
and helps shape interactions with the world.20 Considering the countless ways 
in which names, pronouns, facilities, toys, and clothing are gendered, it is 
impossible to navigate everyday interactions without regard for gender. 
People interact with others on the basis of previously or contemporaneously 
observed signifiers such as clothing, voice, body shape, hairstyle, makeup, 
affectations, etc., that are inextricably tied to normative conceptions of 
gender.21 Since people generally interact with men and women differently,22 
these gender signals are often indispensable to normal social interactions. 
Thus, trans* people frequently attempt to shape how others perceive them 
(while also expressing their own self-conception) by presenting external 
signals such as hairstyle and clothing. A minority of trans* people also 
undergo surgeries to help them express their gender identity.23 
But legal gender can vitiate the ability of trans* people to present their gender 
and can be used to justify denying trans* people the right to self-identification. 
The government imposes gender identity, thereby permitting others to assert 
control over trans* people’s identities. This engenders expressive harm, causes 
 
19 See Spade, supra note 13, at 734 (refuting the mistaken belief that trans people can easily 
change their legal gender by simply presenting evidence to a government agency); cf. Peggy 
McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences 
Through Work in Women’s Studies 1, 4 (Wellesley Coll. Ctr. for Research on Women, Working Paper 
No. 189, 1988) (viewing “white privilege as an invisible package of unearned assets” that benefit 
white people, often without their knowledge or awareness). 
20 Cf. Peter Weinreich, The Operationalisation of Identity Theory in Racial and Ethnic Relations  
(“[Identity is] the totality of one’s self-construal, in which how one construes oneself in the present 
expresses the continuity between how one construes oneself as one was in the past and how one 
construes oneself as one aspires to be in the future.”), in THEORIES OF RACE AND ETHNIC 
RELATIONS 299, 317  (John Rex. & David Mason eds., 1986). 
21 See  generally ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1958) 
(describing the ways in which an individual presents information about herself through visible or 
observable “sign vehicles” and how others use this information to help shape their interactions with her). 
22 As a basic example, people typically refer to others with gendered pronouns like “he” or “she.” 
23 See Spade, supra note 13, at 754 (describing how trans people express gendered characteristics 
through both noninvasive approaches and gender-confirming surgeries). 
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dignitary harm, and enhances exposure to discrimination and assault.24 Legal 
gender thus operates as a mechanism of control and oppression. 
Consider the experience of Alexandra Glover, a twenty-one-year-old 
transgender woman who went to the Louisiana Office of Motor Vehicles 
(OMV) to update her driver’s license photo.25 She did not attempt to change 
her legal gender, which, in Louisiana, requires proof of surgery.26 The OMV 
employee looked at Alexandra, who identifies as a woman and presents as female, 
and declared that Alexandra had to present herself as a man in her driver’s license 
photo: “You can’t present as a woman if you’re listed as a man . . . . If you have 
makeup on or anything like that you’re supposed to take all that off, because 
you are actually a man.”27 At the time, Louisiana’s OMV photo policy stated, 
“At no time will an applicant be photographed when it is obvious he/she is 
misrepresenting his/her gender and/or purposely alternating his/her appearance 
in an effort which would ‘misguide/misrepresent’ his/her identity.”28 
By saying “you are actually a man,” the OMV employee used legal gender, 
and the state’s photo policy, to assert a claim over Alexandra Glover’s gender. 
Moreover, the State—through the employee—attempted to control Alexandra’s 
gender presentation, including her use of makeup. The State compelled 
Alexandra to present an outward identity in conformance with the government’s 
normative conceptions of sex and gender. This was a totalitarian attempt to 
appropriate a transgender woman’s body to buttress traditional gender norms. 
To make matters worse, since trans* people disproportionately experience 
homelessness, unemployment, and poverty,29 they are disproportionately 
 
24 See JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. & NAT’L GAY & 
LESBIAN TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER 
DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 152-55 (2011) (detailing how trans people with identity documents that do not 
match their gender identity face an increased risk of discrimination, harassment, and assault). 
25 See Maya Lau, Transgender Driver Told She Can’t ‘Misrepresent’ Self as a Woman in License Photo, Setting 
Off Review of Louisiana Policy, ADVOCATE (Sept. 11, 2015, 12:09 PM),  http://theadvocate.com/news/1340303 
9-123/louisiana-office-of-motor-vehicles [https://perma.cc/D3NH-C4QX]. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
28 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Photographing Policy, LA. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY: 
OFFICE MOTOR VEHICLES, http://dpsweb.dps.louisiana.gov/omv1.nsf/58c968bd569b099986256cdc0
00806eb/d2c15655fbb79e72862564ae005331dc?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/2A92-PW9X] (last 
updated March 12, 2009)). In response to negative public attention, the Office of Motor Vehicles 
revised their photography policy to allow an individual to be photographed wearing makeup, 
clothing, and accessories “not matching the traditional expectations of an applicant’s gender.” 
Photographing an Applicant Policy, LA. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY: OFFICE MOTOR VEHICLES, 
http://dpsweb.dps.louisiana.gov/omv1.nsf/58c968bd569b099986256cdc000806eb/d2c15655fbb79e72
862564ae005331dc?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/VK93-6DF6] (last updated Aug. 11, 2016).  
29 See GRANT ET AL., supra note 24, at 2-4 (reporting that almost 20% of trans people have 
experienced homelessness and that trans people are twice as likely as the general population to 
experience unemployment and four times as likely to suffer extreme poverty—i.e., a household 
income of less than $10,000 per year). 
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subjected to government-supervised facilities. These facilities—including 
foster homes, homeless shelters, jails, and prisons—segregate based on sex. 
Therefore, trans* people are more likely to be in positions where legal gender, 
and the concomitant government control, is imposed. For example, while 
discontinuing her long-term estrogen treatment, a prison doctor told Ann 
Sweeney, a trans woman who had been placed in a male prison facility, “You 
were born a boy, and you’re going to stay a boy.”30 By enforcing legal gender, 
the State—acting through the prison doctor—repudiated Ann Sweeney’s 
female identity by calling her a “boy” who will always be a “boy” and placing 
her in a male prison facility; moreover, the State vitiated her ability to present 
her body as female by discontinuing her feminizing hormone treatments. 
Thus, the State used Ann Sweeney’s legal gender to occupy and control her 
identity and body. 
B. Reclassifying One’s Gender 
Trans* people are prohibited from opting out of the legal gender system. 
They cannot remove gender markers from their documents or eliminate 
government records of legal gender. Instead, legal gender is marked on 
documents that are ubiquitous and necessary to engage in ordinary activities 
like purchasing alcohol, applying for employment, or traveling. Trans* people 
who attempt to reclassify their gender confront a “rule matrix [of] hundreds 
of formal and informal policies at the federal, state, and local levels.”31 
Gender reclassification schemes exist on a spectrum. Various entities and 
government agencies have different rules regarding gender that determine 
whether trans* people may reclassify and self-define their gender. On one end, 
some entities accept trans* people’s gender identity based on self-identification 
alone. For instance, as of late 2016, homeless shelters that receive federal funding 
must allow trans* people to self-determine their gender and access sex-segregated 
housing according to their gender identity.32 Likewise, Argentina and Ireland allow 
people to change their legal gender based solely on self-identification;33 there is no 
 
30 Darren Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing: Transgendered Prisoners Caught in the Gender 
Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 500-01 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
31 Spade, supra note 13, at 733. 
32 Equal Access in Accordance with an Individual’s Gender Identity in Community Planning and 
Development Programs, 81 Fed. Reg. 64,763, 64,782 (Sept. 21, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 5). 
33 See Gender Recognition Act 2015 (Act No. 25/2015) (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/
2015/act/25/enacted/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/FW9W-9SAQ] (“A person who applies for a gender 
recognition certificate . . . shall furnish . . . a statutory declaration declaring that he or she . . .  has 
a settled and solemn intention of living in the preferred gender for the rest of his or her life . . . .”); 
Emily Schmall, Transgender Advocates Hail Law Easing Rules in Argentina, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/world/americas/transgender-advocates-hail-argentina-la
w.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/MKH4-QJGM] (“Argentina has put in place some of the most liberal 
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need for psychiatric diagnosis, medical certification, or surgery. On the other end, 
certain jurisdictions never allow gender reclassification. In Ohio and Tennessee, for 
example, the legal gender printed on a birth certificate can never be changed.34 
Many prisons similarly refuse to recognize a trans* person’s self-identification.35 
Most jurisdictions in the United States have gender reclassification schemes 
that fall in between the two ends of this spectrum. These jurisdictions require 
various degrees of permission from the medical community or proof of surgery. 
New York, for instance, will change legal gender on a driver’s license based on 
a doctor’s letter certifying trans* identity.36 Until recently,37 New York City’s 
birth certificate policy required a candidate for gender reclassification to 
undergo either phalloplasty or vaginoplasty (i.e., creation of a penis or vagina, 
respectively).38 Federal agencies, such as the Social Security Administration 
and the State Department, have their own gender reclassification schemes.39 
This matrix often prevents trans* people from establishing a consistent 
legal gender across overlapping jurisdictions.40 A trans* woman may be 
 
rules on changing gender in the world, allowing people to alter their gender on official documents without 
first having to receive a psychiatric diagnosis or surgery.”). 
34 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (2016) (“The sex of an individual shall not be changed 
on the original certificate of birth as a result of sex change surgery.”); In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 
831 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987) (finding that a surgical gender transformation procedure was insufficient 
to change petitioner’s sex from male to female under Ohio’s correction of birth record statute); see 
also Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations: State-By-State Guidelines, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://
www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/transgender/changing-birth-certificate-sex-designations 
[https://perma.cc/7FSM-VCUP] (last updated Feb. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Changing Birth Certificate Sex] 
(noting that Tennessee and Ohio do not permit gender reclassification on birth certificates). 
35 See Rosenblum, supra note 30, at 522-29 (noting that many prisons categorize trans* people 
according to their genitalia, which results in harm and abuse to trans* people who have not yet 
undergone genital surgery or do not wish to have this surgery). 
36 See Change of Sex or Gender on a DMV Driver License, Permit or Non-Driver ID Card, N.Y. ST. 
DEP’T MOTOR VEHICLES, http://nysdmv.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/405/kw/gend
er/session/L3RpbWUvMTQ3MTIzMDgzMy9zaWQveUJsdFE1WW0%3D [https://perma.cc/M9
PG-F58R] (last updated Aug. 5, 2015, 4:19 PM) (“Proof of a sex change is a written statement from 
a physician, a psychologist, or a psychiatrist that is printed on letterhead. The statement must certify 
that one gender is your main gender . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
37 New York City recently eliminated the surgery requirement. See infra note 69. 
38 Spade, supra note 13, at 769. 
39 See Know Your Rights: Passports, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, http://www.
transequality.org/know-your-rights/passports [https://perma.cc/Z8JU-AY5T] (“[A] transgender person 
can obtain a passport reflecting his or her current gender by submitting a certification from a physician 
confirming that he or she has had appropriate clinical treatment for gender transition.”); Know Your 
Rights: Social Security, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, http://www.transequality.org/know-
your-rights/social-security [https://perma.cc/BYA8-ZYAH] (“[A] transgender person can change their 
gender on their Social Security records by submitting either government-issued documentation 
reflecting a change, or a certification from a physician confirming that they have had appropriate 
clinical treatment for gender transition.”). 
40 See Spade, supra note 13, at 735 fig.1, app. at 822-41 (highlighting the wide discrepancies 
among states regarding policies for changing one’s legal gender); Changing Birth Certificate Sex, 
supra note 34 (same). 
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recognized as female by homeless shelters and the DMV while her birth 
certificate lists her as male. Regardless, if she is arrested, she is likely to be 
placed in a single-sex, male facility (assuming she has not had genital surgery). 
These discrepancies produce tangible effects. Prior to being estopped by a 
federal judge, the Department of Homeland Security ordered employers to 
fire employees who could not resolve discrepancies between their Social Security 
Administration (SSA) records and their employer’s identity records.41 Until 
recently, the SSA required proof of genital surgery before changing legal gender 
on SSA documents42 while some states had no surgery requirements.43 
Therefore, trans* people who successfully altered their legal gender based on 
state rules, but had not undergone genital surgery to satisfy the SSA’s 
regulations, would have lost their jobs under the Department of Homeland 
Security’s order. 
It is a common misunderstanding that all trans* people want or need genital 
surgery,44 commonly referred to as “sex reassignment surgery.”45 This misconception 
perpetuates the notion that genital surgery should be a requirement for legal 
gender reclassification. In reality, trans* people have different “aims and desires 
for their bodies,” and they express their gender identity accordingly.46 For many 
trans* people, changing external gender signals such as hairstyle, clothing, and 
accessories is sufficient; for others, masculinizing or feminizing hormone 
therapy to change secondary sex characteristics like voice, facial hair, breast 
tissue, and muscle mass is most appropriate.47 
External markers of gender are the most important signals for shaping 
how others observe gender. The fact that only a few people ever know about 
another person’s genitals underscores the extent to which genital surgery 
requirements are unreasonably intrusive. Nearly all people interact with 
friends, strangers, colleagues, classmates, and family members without 
 
41 Spade, supra note 13, at 732 & n.8 (citing Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Chertoff, 552 F. Supp. 2d 
999 (N.D. Cal. 2007)). 
42 See Sunnivie Brydum, Social Security Removes Surgical Requirement for Gender Marker Change, 
ADVOCATE (June 14, 2013, 2:17 PM), http://www.advocate.com/politics/transgender/2013/06/14/soc
ial-security-removes-surgical-requirement-gender-marker-change [https://perma.cc/QG9U-9J7D]; 
(“The SSA removed its requirement that transgender people wanting to amend their gender on a 
Social Security card provide proof of gender reassignment surgery.”). 
43 See Spade, supra note 13, at 736 (noting that Colorado, New York and the District of Columbia do 
not require surgery to change one’s legal gender on a driver’s license). 
44 Id. at 754-55. 
45 E.g., Lenny Bernstein, Here’s How Sex Reassignment Surgery Works, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2015/02/09/heres-how-sex-reassignment-surg
ery-works/ [https://perma.cc/9NJD-AMV5].  
46 Spade, supra note 13, at 754. 
47 Id. at 754-55. 
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genitalia becoming relevant. As genitalia is largely irrelevant to daily 
interactions, trans* people’s genital status should be irrelevant to the State.48 
Legal gender reclassification policies show that while trans* people may 
try to present their gender on their own accord, their identity and expression 
are still constrained by legal gender. Although people tend to think of 
themselves as “authors of [their] own lives,” trans* people, in many respects, 
have little authority over their own official recorded identities.49 Instead, legal 
documentation evinces “the power dynamics between the individual and the 
state about the authorship of identity.”50 The rules governing gender identity 
“appropriat[e] individual autonomy to define the self ” and attempt to create 
and maintain identity, often without the assent of the individual.51 
Government rejection of trans* people’s gender identity causes expressive 
and dignitary harm. The State causes expressive harm by meaningfully 
repudiating trans* people’s identities.52 It simultaneously engages in dignitary 
harm through privacy invasion and the infliction of emotional distress.53 This 
expressive and dignitary harm, while abhorrent on its own, is also fundamentally 
linked to violence against the trans* community. The rejection of trans* 
people’s self-defined gender identity is often a triggering point for violence 
against trans* individuals—such as when a state official asks for identification, 
finds that the trans* individual’s gender marker does not match their outward 
appearance, and then proceeds to assault or harass them.54 
Moreover, the consequences produced by the government’s repudiation of 
trans* people’s identity correlates with and likely contributes to high rates of 
depression and suicide—i.e., violence against oneself.55 A staggering 41% of 
 
48 Some courts have disagreed with this logic. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 
1215, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that Title VII’s prohibition of sex-based discrimination was 
not triggered when an employer asked about a trans woman’s genitals and then fired her because her 
answer did not match her gender expression). 
49 See Annette R. Appell, Certifying Identity, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 361, 361, 388-90 (2014) (summarizing 
how birth certificates complicate transgender people’s ability to control their lives and identities). 
50 Id. at 362. 
51 Id. at 372. 
52 Cf. Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 
1385-86 (2000) (describing how expressivists view the actions of legal officials as “meaningful” and 
capable of “express[ing] condemnation” and illustrating the point by discussing how state-sanctioned 
segregation labeled black Americans as inferior). 
53 For an overview of dignitary torts generally—as well as defamation, invasion of privacy, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, specifically—see Cristina Carmody Tilley, Rescuing 
Dignitary Torts from the Constitution, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 65, 65-67, 70 (2012). 
54 Trans* people living with incongruent identification are often exposed to harassment, 
assault, and police brutality. GRANT ET AL., supra note 24, at 154, 158. 
55 See id. at 2 (noting that 41% of respondents in a transgender survey reported having contemplated 
suicide and that the rate was higher for victims of assault and harassment). In one survey, suicide attempts 
were reported by 63-78% of trans* people subjected to physical or sexual violence at school, 57-61% of those 
harassed by law enforcement, 60-70% of those who have suffered physical or sexual violence by law 
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trans* people have attempted suicide, and this rate elevates when state 
officials such as teachers reject a trans* person’s identity.56 Notably, this 
statistic cannot capture the emotional distress and harm that accompanies a 
suicide attempt, or the lives of trans* people who have died by suicide. This 
statistic does not record the lives of people like Leelah Alcorn who are not 
alive to take a survey, but must still be remembered and counted.57 The human 
toll of oppression is underrepresented and not fully expressed, even by such 
horrifying statistics. The expressive and dignitary harm, and exposure to 
discrimination, harassment, and violence that accompany legal gender 
classification, are of the utmost concern for trans* people and those concerned 
with human rights. 
C. The Government’s Impermissible Appropriation of Identity 
Defining one’s own identity is one of the most personal and individual 
practices one can engage in; it is central to autonomy.58 But for trans* people, this 
identity-defining process has been impermissibly appropriated by the State. The 
State elevates “political or communal self-definition” above individual self-
definition.59 This “republican vision” rejects the liberal conception of individual self-
government.60 Instead, the “self” in self-government is the political community.61 
Justice Scalia exhibited this republican vision in his Obergefell dissent. By 
declining to join the majority’s decision, which held that states must 
recognize same-sex marriages,62 Scalia rejected the ability of individuals to 
 
enforcement, and 69% of those who have experienced homelessness. ANN P. HAAS ET AL., AM. FOUND. 
FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION & THE WILLIAMS INST., SUICIDE ATTEMPTS AMONG TRANSGENDER 
AND GENDER NON-CONFORMING ADULTS: FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER 
DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 2 (2014). 
56 See GRANT ET AL., supra note 24, at 45 (“[S]uicide attempt rates rose dramatically when 
teachers were the reported perpetrators [of harassment and assault].”). 
57 See J. Bryan Lowder, Listen to Leelah Alcorn’s Final Words, SLATE: OUTWARD (Dec. 31, 2014, 4:13 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/12/31/leelah_alcorn_transgender_teen_from_ohio_should_be_hon
ored_in_death.html [https://perma.cc/W4M7-BMTR] (publishing Alcorn’s suicide note, which stated, 
“My death needs to mean something. My death needs to be counted in the number of transgender 
people who commit suicide this year. I want someone to look at that number and say ‘that’s fucked 
up’ and fix it.”); see also Jennifer Finney Boylan, Opinion, How to Save Your Life: A Response to 
Leelah Alcorn’s Suicide Note, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/07/opinion/a-
response-to-leelah-alcorns-suicide-note.html [https://perma.cc/Y2DG-CK8G] (reacting to the death of 
Leelah Alcorn and her suicide note). 
58 See Appell, supra note 49, at 388-89 (“Those who are transgender face an original birth 
certificate that documents their birth sex, but not their gender identity. It is difficult to imagine 
anything much more personal and autonomous than defining one’s own identity.” (footnote omitted)). 
59 See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 761 (describing the “[r]epublican [c]ritique” of individualism). 
60 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). By republican and liberal, Rubenfeld refers to modes 
of political thought, as opposed to American political parties. 
61 Id. 
62 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
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define their own identity through marital relations with individuals of the 
same gender. For Justice Scalia, the decision “robs the People of the most 
important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won 
in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.”63 He 
minimized the right to individual identity and elevated the community’s right 
to control individuals; he submerged individual identity beneath the will of 
the communal polity.64 
For republicanism, individual identity is viewed as an assault on the 
communal identity. Justice Alito’s Obergefell dissent argues that the legalization of 
same-sex marriage will be used to vilify opponents of same-sex marriage and 
vitiate their “rights of conscience.”65 According to Alito, “I assume that those who 
cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in the recesses of their 
homes, but if they repeat those views in public, they will risk being labeled as 
bigots and treated as such by governments, employers, and schools.”66 Thus, 
those who “cling to old beliefs” must have the power to compel how 
individuals in same-sex relationships self-identify in order to bolster those 
“old beliefs.” 
For liberal individualism, the legalization of same-sex marriage allows 
gays, lesbians, and bisexual people to define their identities through marriage 
(and have their identities recognized by the State) while others can still 
partake in different self-definition practices, like opposite-sex marriage or 
remaining single. However, for republicanism, allowing states to define 
marriage provides “a way for people with different beliefs to live together in 
a single nation.”67 Instead of allowing individual self-government for matters 
of individual identity, political communities (i.e., states) should engage in 
communal rulemaking that narrows individual agency. 
Similarly, rules regarding legal gender identity allow the State to 
appropriate trans* people’s right to engage in individual self-determination. 
Jurisdictions that deny or restrict trans* people’s right to define their legal 
 
63 Id. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision 
usurps the constitutional right of the people to decide whether to keep or alter the traditional 
understanding of marriage.”). 
64 Justice Scalia also exhibited this vision in Lawrence v. Texas, where he wrote, “[T]he Court 
has taken sides in the culture war, departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the 
democratic rules of engagement are observed. Many Americans do not want persons who openly 
engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as 
teachers in their children’s schools, or as boarders in their home. They view this as protecting 
themselves and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and destructive.” 539 
U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
65 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2642-43 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 2643. 
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gender (or opt out of legal gender) limit trans* people’s identity-making 
autonomy in favor of communal definitions of gender and sex. 
For example, a trans* woman born in Tennessee will always have a birth 
certificate that labels her as “male,” regardless of the fact that she is a 
woman.68 Until recently,69 a trans* woman born in New York City would have 
a birth certificate that says “male” unless and until she underwent 
vaginoplasty (i.e., creation of a vagina) regardless of whether she wanted this 
surgery or could afford it.70 Even if she dressed in a feminine way, underwent 
hormone therapy, and had other surgeries, her outward presentation as a 
female or self-defined gender identity would not matter for legal gender 
purposes. This is so despite the fact that almost everyone who would see her 
legal documentation, such as police officers and liquor store cashiers, would 
not interact with her genitalia. 
For both of these women, the rules about whether she can change her legal 
gender evince a communal and political conception about what it means to be 
“male” or “female.” In Tennessee, being female means being born with a vagina; 
until recently, in New York City, being female meant being born with a vagina 
or having a vagina constructed through surgery. Either way, being a woman is 
inextricably linked to having a vagina. This communal definition of “woman” 
thus proscribes individual actors from defining themselves on their own accord. 
Since the same trans* woman would qualify for a “female” driver’s license 
in California, but be forced to retain a “male” license in Tennessee,71 gender 
is not a universal or stable category. Although “male” and “female” identities 
do not stand on their own—in the way that medieval cathedral walls do not 
stand independently—these gender identity laws buttress normative sex and 
gender conceptions. But trans* people and their bodies should not be used as 
“symbolic-cultural site[s] upon which human societies inscript their moral 
order”;72 rather, we should have more faith that trans* people can renegotiate 
and define their own identities. 
 
68 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
69 New York City now allows trans* people to change their legal gender without proof of surgery. 
Curtis M. Wong, New York’s Transgender Residents Will Now Be Able to Change Birth Certificate Sex 
Designation Without Surgery, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/12/08/new-york-transgender-birt_n_6290590.html [https://perma.cc/9ADJ-28LS]. 
70 Spade, supra note 13, at 769. The old rules specifically required vaginoplasty or phalloplasty 
and were notable for delineating the specific surgeries that were required. See id. at 736 
(distinguishing New York City’s formerly strict policies for changing legal gender on a birth 
certificate from California’s requirement that an applicant show “he or she has undergone any of a 
variety of gender confirmation surgeries”). 
71 Id. at app. 822-28. 
72 Cf. SEYLA BENHABIB, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE 
GLOBAL ERA 84, 104 (2002) (positing that “societies inscript their moral order” upon women and 
their bodies by regulating sexual reproduction and gendered presentation and arguing that we should 
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However, individuals cannot engage in unbridled self-identification since 
many types of identities cause harm to third parties or are legitimately 
undesirable. For example, society has a legitimate desire to not protect the 
identity of “murderers.”73 Society may not want to recognize an unrestricted 
identity of “gun owner” that would prevent background checks or assault 
rifles bans. Nonetheless, society must also prevent the majoritarian will from 
denying people the right to identity.74 Unrestrained individualism and 
republicanism thus present a choice between Scylla and Charybdis. But this 
dichotomous choice is not inevitable, and the antitotalitarian principle 
underlying the Constitution sails between the two: while the government can 
restrict certain liberties, it cannot submerge the individual and affirmatively 
compel individual identity and conformity. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTIONS AGAINST TOTALITARIANISM 
A. The Constitution’s Antitotalitarian Principle in Substantive Due Process 
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court posited that substantive due process 
rights are those “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ and ‘implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist 
if they were sacrificed.’”75 However, this formulation has hardly been uniformly 
applied. In Lawrence, the Court held that same-sex intimacy is a liberty protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment,76 and in Obergefell, the Court held that the ability 
to choose a partner in marriage is a fundamental right that cannot be restricted by 
 
have “more faith in the capacity of ordinary political actors to renegotiate their own narratives of 
identity and difference through multicultural encounters in a democratic civil society”). 
73 Although laws compelling us to be “non-murderer[s]” do standardize us, operate on our 
bodies, and impinge physical acts, they do not compel “a defined role or identity with substantial, 
affirmative, institutionalized functions. And although a person can refrain from murder only by 
refraining from certain physical actions, his body is in no affirmative way taken over or put to use. 
Laws against murder foreclose an avenue; they do not harness us to a given seat and direct us down 
a single, regulated road.” Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 793 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
74 See Richard A. Posner & Eric J. Segall, Opinion, Justice Scalia’s Majoritarian Theocracy, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/opinion/justice-scalias-majoritarian-theocracy
.html [https://perma.cc/FZ8K-WWHC] (arguing that Justice Scalia’s dissents in the Supreme Court’s 
four major gay rights cases evince a “political idea [that] verges on a majoritarian theocracy”). 
75 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citations omitted) (first quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); then quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)). 
76 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The petitioners are entitled to respect for 
their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their 
private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the 
full right to engage in their conduct without intervention by the government.”). 
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gender,77 even though homosexuality was criminalized at the country’s founding 
and gays have been oppressed throughout American history.78 
Lawrence noted that “[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but not 
in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”79 
Obergefell declared that rights are not solely defined “by who exercised them 
in the past”; otherwise, “new groups could not invoke rights once denied.”80 
Rights “come not from ancient sources alone,” but “rise, too, from a better 
informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty 
that remains urgent in our own era.”81 Oftentimes, commentators focus on 
what is being denied—e.g., the denial of abortion, same-sex marriage, or 
contraception.82 But focusing on what the law prohibits does not reveal the 
underlying principles of substantive due process. 
When applying substantive due process rights, the Court has focused on 
the affirmative or productive consequences of the law in question.83 In doing so, 
the Court invalidates laws that allow the State to submerge the individual, 
appropriate the individual’s means of identity-making, and affirmatively shape 
the individual’s life.84 Substantive due process “is not the freedom to do certain, 
particular acts determined to be fundamental through some ever-progressing 
normative lens. It is the fundamental freedom not to have one’s life too totally 
determined by a progressively more normalizing state.”85 The antitotalitarian 
principle is thus invoked to protect these fundamental rights. 
Substantive due process rights, such as the freedom to not bear children, 
protect against laws that have extensive affirmative effects on individual lives: 
 
77 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015) (“The Court now holds that 
same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry.”). 
78 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 594-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the nation’s history and 
tradition of imposing criminal sanctions on “sodomy”). 
79 Id. at 572 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
80 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
81 Id. at 2602; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (“[The drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment] knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once 
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in 
every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.”); Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (describing substantive due process and the 
balance between liberty and the demands of organized society as “having regard to what history 
teaches are the traditions from which [the country] developed as well as the traditions from which 
it broke” (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))). 
82 See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 783 (acknowledging that the “universal” method of privacy 
analysis begins by asking what is being prohibited, but suggesting that we should focus not on “what 
is being prohibited, but [on] what is being produced”). 
83 Id. at 784. 
84 Id.; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) (discussing the limits upon the 
State’s ability to achieve desirable ends that affect the public). 
85 Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 784. 
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At the simplest, most quotidian level, such laws tend to take over the lives of 
the persons involved: they occupy and preoccupy. They affirmatively and very 
substantially shape a person’s life; they direct a life’s development along a 
particular avenue. These laws do not simply proscribe one act or remove one 
liberty; they inform the totality of a person’s life.86 
Thus, the Constitution prohibits certain government actions that affirmatively 
compel lives toward a government-determined end. 
Roe v. Wade’s holding that the Constitution’s right to liberty encompasses 
a woman’s decision of whether to terminate her pregnancy87 rejects the 
affirmative effects of anti-abortion laws. Immediately after announcing its 
holding, the Court explained that the “[t]he detriment that the State would 
impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice,” including 
medically diagnosable harm, the psychological and physical taxation of 
pregnancy, labor, and child-rearing, the distress associated with an unwanted 
child, and the problem of bringing a child into a family that is unable to care 
for it.88 Thus, Roe’s rationale did not focus on the denial of the right to 
abortion inasmuch as it emphasized that anti-abortion laws affirmatively 
compel the lives of women toward the path of “mother” and “caretaker.” 
Anti-abortion laws had transformed the lives and identities of women 
in far-reaching, consequential ways: they shaped their day-to-day actions, 
radically altered financial statuses, changed occupations, career trajectories, 
and preoccupations, and engendered—for many—the identity of “mother.”89 
Therefore, “the decision whether to have a child [is protected] because 
parenthood alters so dramatically an individual’s self-definition.”90 Anti-abortion 
laws “drafted” women into the service of the State to produce a population through 
compulsory pregnancy, labor, and, in most circumstances, childcare.91 Rubenfeld 
explains, “The exertion of power over the body is in this respect comparable to the 
exertion of power over a child’s mind: its effect can be formative, shaping identity 
at a point where intellectual resistance cannot meet it.”92 
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court affirmed a preliminary injunction 
enjoining Oregon from requiring all children between the ages of eight and 
 
86 Id. 
87 See 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“The right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s 
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”). 
88 Id. 
89 See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 788-91 (describing the many ways in which “anti-abortion 
laws exert power productively over a woman’s body” and “forcefully reshape and redirect her life”). 
90 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), overruled by 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) . 
91 Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 791. 
92 Id. at 789. 
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sixteen to attend public school through the eighth grade.93 By virtue of the 
antitotalitarian principle recognized in Meyer, the State could not “standardize 
its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.”94 
Moreover, the Court expressed concern about children being conscripted into 
the State’s service, noting that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the 
State” and that she has “additional obligations.”95 Together, Meyer and Pierce 
show that the government cannot affirmatively compel citizens to conform to 
its own desires. 
The Lawrence Court evinced a realization that anti-sodomy laws affirmatively 
fashioned gay people as criminals. Lawrence protected the liberty of “an 
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain 
intimate conduct” “from unwarranted government intrusions.”96 The laws 
involved in Lawrence prohibited more than just a particular sexual act: they 
sought to control personal relationships.97 Moreover, the criminalization of 
same-sex intimacy—and, therefore, the criminalization of gay people who engage 
in sexual intimacy—“‘legally sanction[ed] discrimination against [homosexuals] 
in a variety of ways unrelated to the criminal law,’ including in the areas of 
‘employment, family issues, and housing.’”98 
The Court has also invoked antitotalitarianism to protect an individual’s 
right to choose a spouse of his or her choice. In Loving v. Virginia, 99 the Court 
discarded interracial marriage bans instituted to segregate racial communities, 
delegitimize relations among racial groups, and—from an abhorrent eugenics 
perspective—produce “untainted”100 blood. The right to choose a spouse 
“resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”101 
Therefore, the State may not restrict a person’s choice of spouse to enforce 
racism, segregation, and eugenics. 
Likewise, Obergefell reflected a similar concern regarding the affirmative 
effects of restrictions on marriage. The Court’s opinion opens by proclaiming 
that “[t]he Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that 
includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to 
 
93 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925). 
94 Id. at 534-35 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)). 
95 Id. at 535. 
96 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
97 See id. at 567 (“The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not 
entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being 
punished as criminals.”). 
98 Id. at 581-82 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Morales, 
826 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. App. 1992), rev’d, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994)).  
99 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
100 Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 791-92. 
101 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
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define and express their identity.”102 The Court went on to observe that “the right 
to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual 
autonomy.”103 Thus, “the decision whether and whom to marry is among life’s 
momentous acts of self-definition.”104 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy 
expressed concern for individuals excluded from the right to marry because 
of their partner’s gender: “Marriage responds to the universal fear that a 
lonely person might call out only to find no one there.”105 Marriage safeguards 
children and families by conferring legal recognition and structure, over a 
thousand marital benefits, and respect.106 Ultimately, Obergefell expressed 
concern with how the State’s marriage restrictions appropriated the means of 
self-definition and the resultant production of loneliness, harm to children 
and families of same-sex couples, and exposure of same-sex families to undue 
legal, medical, economic, and personal risk. 
B. The Constitution’s Antitotalitarianism in First Amendment Jurisprudence 
The core of the First Amendment is “the right not to be compelled to 
make a false affirmation of one’s identity, ideas or beliefs,”107 and this core 
evinces the Constitution’s proscription against totalitarianism. The First 
Amendment protects individuals from affirmative, government-compelled 
speech that vitiates their ability to speak, believe, and think independently. 
The seminal First Amendment case West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette struck down compulsory flag salutes and pledges in schools.108 The 
Court held that where the freedom asserted does not “colli[de] with rights 
asserted by any other individual,”109 “censorship or suppression of expression 
is tolerated by our Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and 
present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and 
punish.”110 The First Amendment’s paramount concern is the freedom of 
identity, ideas, and beliefs, and only a “clear and present danger” can override 
this concern.111 Barnette explained that these antitotalitarian principles 
developed on the same soil that produced a laissez-faire “philosophy that the 
 
102 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015) (emphasis added). 
103 Id. at 2599. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 2600. 
106 Id. at 2600-01. 
107 Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S. Military’s Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1143 (1997). 
108 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
109 Id. at 630. In situations where the freedom asserted collides with the rights asserted by 
another, the State may determine where the rights of one end and another begin. Id. 
110 Id. at 633. 
111 Id. 
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individual was the center of society, that his liberty was attainable through 
the absence of governmental restraints.”112 Today, given the increasing 
integration of society and expanded government, the First Amendment needs 
to proscribe affirmative government compulsion, even regarding extreme 
dissent or disagreement: 
[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That 
would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to 
differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order. 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess 
by word or act their faith therein.113 
Thus, even ideas, identities, or beliefs that strike at the core of the existing 
order are protected by our antitotalitarian Constitution. 
Wooley v. Maynard114 reiterated Barnette’s proscription against compelled 
speech and totalitarian government. Mr. and Mrs. Maynard were Jehovah’s 
Witnesses who viewed New Hampshire’s “Live Free or Die” motto, which 
was embossed on all license plates, as repugnant to their moral, religious, and 
political beliefs.115 New Hampshire compelled Mr. and Mrs. Maynard to 
display a “mobile billboard” that affronted their identity.116 By refusing to 
allow them to cover the motto, the State infringed upon the Maynards’s “right 
to refrain from speaking” that, along with “the right to speak,” is part of the 
“broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”117 The Court explained, 
“The First Amendment protects the rights of individuals to hold a point of 
view different from the majority and to refuse to foster . . . an idea they find 
morally objectionable.”118 
Ultimately, the First Amendment prevents the State from assuming 
control of individual identity, ideas, and beliefs—including the offensive, 
different, or contrarian: “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an 
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”119 
The Constitution does not exist to reify and ossify the current order; rather, 
 
112 Id. at 639. 
113 Id. at 642. 
114 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
115 Id. at 707. 
116 Id. at 715 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
117 Id. at 714 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637). 
118 Id. at 715. 
119 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). The Court ultimately held that Texas may not 
criminally prosecute a flag-burning protester despite the state’s interest in preserving the flag as a 
symbol of national unity. Id. at 420. 
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it affords citizens the right to define themselves with respect to matters of 
personhood and identity. 
III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL TOTALITARIANISM                                          
DIRECTED AT TRANS* PEOPLE 
A. Compulsory Gender Identity Is Impermissible Totalitarianism 
The Constitution’s protection of the rights to privacy, identity, speech, 
belief, and life-determining decisions serves as a bulwark against a totalitarian 
attempt to submerge the individual beneath the State. Therefore, “[t]he 
danger . . . is a particular kind of creeping totalitarianism, an unarmed 
occupation of individuals’ lives . . . [:] a society standardized and normalized, 
in which lives are too substantially or too rigidly directed.”120 This fear of 
state power has led to substantive due process rights regarding child-rearing, 
bodily autonomy regarding abortions, choice in marriage and sexual intimacy, 
and First Amendment proscriptions on compelled speech. This antitotalitarian 
principle must also extend to the right to self-define one’s gender identity. 
1. Compulsory Gender Identity Impermissibly Appropriates             
Individual Identity, Autonomy, and Self-Definition 
The danger of a totalitarianism that appropriates individual autonomy 
and affirmatively compels people along particular avenues is realized when 
the State controls trans* people’s identity. As Meyer121 and Pierce122 indicate, 
the State cannot affirmatively shape citizens to fit its own normative desires. 
Trans* people are not “creature[s] of the State”;123 they are individuals with a 
right to identity. 
Just as the criminalization of same-sex intimacy in Lawrence sanctioned 
discrimination against gay people in both government and nongovernment 
settings,124 the State’s denial of gender identity sanctions the oppression of 
trans* people. With incongruent legal documents, trans* people are at an increased 
risk of unemployment, harassment, violence,125 and placement in inappropriate 
 
120 Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 784. 
121 See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text. 
122 See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. 
123 Cf. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (noting that a child is not a “mere 
creature of the State”). 
124 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
125 GRANT ET AL., supra note 24, at 153-155; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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sex-segregated facilities. Through administrative gender documentation, these 
laws affirmatively shape the opportunities and security of trans* people.126 
Moreover, state restrictions on gender reclassification deny individual 
autonomy and self-definition. Like choosing one’s spouse, which Obergefell 
describes as an identity-defining act,127 representing one’s gender is inherently 
identity-defining. Gender defines and shapes our interactions: gender affects the 
pronouns we use to refer to individuals and the way in which we treat them. 
Thus, gender, even more so than marital status, is a central point around 
which identity and interpersonal interactions are ordered. Compulsory 
gender identity thus “do[es] not simply proscribe one act or remove one 
liberty; [it] inform[s] the totality of a person’s life.”128 
2. Compulsory Gender Identity Violates the First Amendment                 
Right to Freedom From Compelled Speech 
Compelling trans* people to identify themselves by their assigned legal 
gender is repugnant to the First Amendment. Together, Barnette129 and 
Wooley130 delineate two axes by which to evaluate the burden imposed by 
compelled affirmation: “[1] the degree of linkage (or attenuation) that exists 
between the message and the speaker; and [2] the opportunity available to 
the speaker to make clear to others her disagreement with the message she is 
forced to propound.”131 In Barnette, the compelled flag salute was immediate, 
personal, and required verbal action and a physical salute; however, the students 
could note their involuntary participation to classmates and teachers.132 Thus, 
the weight of the burden in Barnette fell on the degree of linkage axis.133 In 
Wooley, the link between the Maynards and the compelled affirmation on their 
license plate was less personal and more attenuated: the Maynards were not 
required to speak the state’s motto but were required to display it on their 
 
126 See Spade, supra note 13, at 747 (“The ubiquity of the assumption that gender classification is 
a proper category of administrative governance, combined with the economic and political impairment 
that results from being improperly classified, allows us to analyze disparities in life chances across 
administratively constructed populations. This provides a way of thinking about inequality and 
oppression outside of individualizing discrimination frameworks and instead through a biopolitical 
understanding of the management of populations and the distribution of life chances.”). 
127 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597, 2599 (2015) (finding that marriage is a 
fundamental right and noting that that the “liberties [protected by the Constitution] extend to 
certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that 
define personal identity and beliefs”). 
128 Cf. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 784 (discussing totalitarianism in the anti-abortion and 
“anti-miscegenation” law context). 
129 See supra notes 108–13 and accompanying text. 
130 See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text. 
131 Wolff, supra note 107, at 1200. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 1200-01. 
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property.134 However, the Maynards did not have an ample opportunity to 
communicate their disagreement with fellow motorists or pedestrians who 
viewed their license plate; thus, the weight of the burden fell on the latter axis.135 
Trans* people are burdened by both axes: they are compelled to affirm a 
message that is inherently opposed to their identity, and their ability to 
communicate their disagreement with that compelled affirmation is vitiated 
by legal gender. When Alexandra Glover attempted to change her driver’s 
license photo and the OMV employee asked what gender she was listed as, 
Alexandra was effectively compelled to say “male” because of her legal gender.136 
When trans* people are not allowed to record their true identities on legal 
documents (or opt out of legal gender altogether), they are compelled to 
affirmatively identify with a gender that is contrary to their core identity. 
Moreover, the government’s imposition and maintenance of legal gender 
supersedes trans* people’s ability to effectively communicate their disagreement 
with this policy. Although trans* people can change how others view and 
understand them through hairstyle, makeup, hormone treatment, surgeries, 
and outward gender presentation, state actors and private actors can use legal 
gender to abrogate these efforts.137 The Louisiana OMV employee denied 
Alexandra Glover’s ability to express her disagreement with her legal gender 
by saying, “You can’t present as a woman if you’re listed as a man . . . . If you 
have makeup on or anything like that you’re supposed to take all that off, 
because you are actually a man.”138 Similarly, Ann Sweeney’s prison doctor told 
her, “You were born a boy, and you’re going to stay a boy” before discontinuing 
her hormone treatments.139 
The very existence of legal gender provided these state actors with 
ammunition to vitiate trans* people’s ability to communicate their own gender 
and express disagreement with gender identity policies. Thus, legal gender 
implicates both axes of the Barnette–Wooley compelled affirmation jurisprudence. 
 
* * * 
The government occupies the lives of trans* people by defining gender 
without their consent. While not as visibly affirmative as Sparta’s communal 
 
134 Id. at 1201. 
135 Id. at 1202. 
136 See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 
137 By refusing to recognize trans* people’s gender identities, the State enables ordinary 
citizens and government officials to reject their identities. As “law can have a causal effect on the 
development, enforcement, internalization, and reinforcement of norms,” FREDERICK SCHAUER, 
THE FORCE OF LAW 145 (2015), requirements that trans* people are labeled as their assigned birth 
sex reinforce a misunderstanding that trans* people cannot self-identify their gender.  
138 Lau, supra note 25 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
139 Rosenblum, supra note 30 at 500-01 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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child-rearing indoctrination program,140 the State’s legal gender system seeks 
to compel trans* people to maintain their legal gender identity or, in some 
jurisdictions, conform to the “opposite sex” entirely through invasive genital 
surgery requirements.141 The State, in many ways, seeks to compel homogeneity 
among “men” and among “women” without allowing for much variation in how 
trans* people express themselves as male, female, genderqueer,142 gender X,143 
etc. The State uses trans* bodies to buttress normative conceptions of sex and 
submerges trans* people beneath the State for this purpose. 
B. Affording Trans* People Limited Agency Within a Restrictive Legal Gender 
Matrix Does Not Eliminate Unconstitutional Totalitarianism 
Merely allowing some trans* people to reclassify their gender—and restricting 
such opportunities through onerous requirements—does not ameliorate the 
government’s unconstitutional actions. These schemes still impose gender identity 
and evince totalitarian control over trans* people’s lives. Moreover, the 
Constitution forbids coercive conditions on exercising constitutional rights. 
First, the government does not allow trans* people to opt out of the 
gender system. No jurisdiction in the United States allows individuals to 
officially identify as “genderqueer” or “Gender X”; one cannot have a driver’s 
license or birth certificate without a gender marker of “male” or “female.” 
Thus, Michel Foucault’s view that laws can “interject[] us in a network of 
norms” aptly captures the experience of trans* people in the United States 
today.144 Both trans* people and nontrans* people cannot escape this network. 
Second, the government’s very act of imposing gender is totalitarianism. 
Imposing identity is not a legitimate domain of governance. The government 
does not, for instance, label babies born to Catholics as “Catholic” and wed them 
to that identity unless they undergo financially burdensome, time-consuming, 
and potentially unwanted, painful procedures. The government does record some 
information relevant to identity, like political party affiliation and marital status, 
but this kind of information is directly related to government practices like 
 
140 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
141 See supra notes 26, 38, and accompanying text. 
142 See, e.g., Julie Scelfo, A University Recognizes a Third Gender: Neutral, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/education/edlife/a-university-recognizes-a-third
-gender-neutral.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8FL2-D4PJ] (reporting on the University of Vermont’s 
recognition of the genderqueer identity as a third gender, distinct from both male and female). 
143 See Matt Dathan, Gender Neutral Passports Move a Step Closer to Reality After Labour Backing, 
INDEPENDENT (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/gender-neutral-
passports-move-a-step-closer-to-reality-10123734.html [https://perma.cc/3CBM-3YJB] (explaining 
that the United Kingdom is considering introducing “Gender X” passports for people who identify 
as neither male nor female (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
144 Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 783. 
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voting in primary elections and determining tax benefits, and these identities 
can be changed if and when individuals desire to do so. 
Third, the government cannot impose impermissible, coercive conditions 
that affect access to constitutional rights. The “unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine . . . guards against a characteristic form of government overreaching and 
thus serves a state-checking function.”145 It preserves “spheres of private ordering 
from government domination” and ensures that citizens receive equal treatment 
from the government,146 bolstering the Constitution’s proscription against 
totalitarianism. Examples of “unconstitutional conditions” include requiring 
veterans to swear loyalty to the government before receiving a veterans’ 
property-tax exemption147 and denying state unemployment benefits to a religious 
woman who remained unemployed because she would not work on the Sabbath.148 
Forcing citizens to choose between accepting government benefits (or 
escaping harm) and exercising constitutional rights equates to a denial of 
those rights. Thus, in Sherbert, the Court found that a state may not condition 
the receipt of unemployment benefits on a willingness to accept employment 
that conflicts with one’s religious practices: 
[T]he pressure upon [the claimant] to forego [her religious] practice is 
unmistakable. The ruling [below] forces her to choose between following the 
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and 
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on 
the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind 
of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against 
appellant for her Saturday worship.149 
Thus, the government does not need to directly target constitutional rights 
to violate them; restricting access to constitutional rights with unacceptable 
conditions is also a violation of those rights. 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine highlights the Constitution’s 
proscription against totalitarianism. These kinds of conditions alter the balance 
of power between the government and individuals and diminish the individual’s 
ability to maintain self-governing autonomy.150 They also “skew the distribution 
of constitutional rights among rightholders”;151 those who comply with the 
 
145 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1506 (1989). 
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147 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) (noting that “the denial of a tax exemption 
for engaging in certain speech necessarily will have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain 
from the proscribed speech,” thereby violating their free speech rights). 
148 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-06 (1963). 
149 Id. at 404. 
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unconstitutional condition have greater rights than those who do not. Additionally, 
when these conditions affect those who depend on government assistance or 
benefits, they “create an undesirable caste hierarchy in the enjoyment of 
constitutional rights.”152 Those who depend on government assistance like food 
stamps and veteran’s benefits are disproportionately affected and thus retain fewer 
rights than those free from such coercion. 
The gender rule matrix153 constitutes an unconstitutional condition. It forces 
trans* people to choose between their bodily autonomy (i.e., avoiding unwanted 
surgeries or medical interventions) and their right to identity (i.e., self-defining 
their legal gender). One’s constitutional right to identity cannot be subject to such 
an egregious condition, nor can one’s right to bodily autonomy. This forced choice 
is particularly important because the ability to define one’s legal gender—and 
obtain appropriate legal documents—is fundamental to basic tasks such as 
obtaining employment, securing housing, and traveling. 
Moreover, similar to many other unconstitutional conditions, the gender 
rule matrix skews rights among the population. It restricts trans* people’s 
ability to define their own identity based on a myriad of federal, state, and 
administrative rules—and thus distributes more rights to those who live in 
more progressive jurisdictions with more permissive gender identity laws and 
those who want and can afford gender-confirmation surgery. Additionally, 
restrictive gender classification rules particularly affect low-income trans* 
people who disproportionately rely on government services, interact with the 
police, are incarcerated, and are less likely to have employment options with 
nondiscriminatory employers. 
By preventing trans* people from self-defining their gender or opting out 
of the gender system, the government affirmatively produces identity. The 
State compels “male” or “female” identity when doing so is contrary to the 
person’s self-conception. The right to identity resides with the individual; the 
State cannot conscript people’s bodies into its service by placing them in 
Spartan barracks,154 forcing them to bear children,155 compelling affirmations,156 
criminalizing their sexual identity157—or by conditioning privileges on renouncing 
one’s freedom from such coercion.158 The Constitution’s antitotalitarian principle 
prohibits state interjection into identity-formation. Forcing trans* people to be 
marked as their assigned gender is totalitarianism. Defining gender is at the 
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155 See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
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core of autonomy: individuals must be able to choose their identity or opt out 
of the gender system. Otherwise, they are submerged beneath the State. 
IV. OPPORTUNITIES TO ELIMINATE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS 
A. The Government Must Eliminate or Limit the Use of Legal Gender 
The government may desire some system of legal gender. However, 
several considerations caution against the overuse of gender markers and 
government imposition of gender. First, one’s assigned gender at birth may 
not be an appropriate label. For example, the Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) identify trans* women as “men who have sex with men.”159 But a 
trans* woman is not a man and she may or may not have sex with men. As a 
result of this misclassification, there is no nationwide information about the 
HIV rate within this community, which is likely to be extraordinarily high.160 
The CDC’s definition, which uses one’s gender assigned at birth, is 
fundamentally problematic and impedes research on the HIV epidemic 
within the trans* community. 
Second, legal gender on documents may not be very useful for personal 
identification. One’s outward expression, documented on a photograph, is more 
effective than an “M” or “F” gender marker. Consider that while some states once 
included race on driver’s licenses, this is no longer considered necessary for 
identification purposes.161 Moreover, the government can accurately identify 
people without gender markers. The Social Security Administration, for 
instance, effectively documents the lives, disability status, marital status, and 
employment status of Americans with a nine-digit number that does not reflect 
gender.162 Thus, whenever the government considers using gender markers, it 
should consider whether doing so is necessary, useful or efficient. 
Moreover, the government should not impose gender identity at birth. All 
people—trans* and nontrans*—should identify or record their gender at a later 
time. Germany, for instance, allows parents of intersex children (i.e., children 
born with physically indeterminate gender characteristics) to record “X” instead 
 
159 Spade, supra note 13, at 814 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Email from Carrie 
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of “male” or “female” on birth certificates.163 These children are not expected to 
remain “Gender X” forever but are expected to choose the “male” or “female” 
identity at some point in the future.164 Our government could allow all children 
to select a gender when they are ready or even permit them to remain “Gender 
X.” For trans* people, imposing an incorrect gender identity will increase the 
long-term risk of depression, ostracism, intense discrimination, and suicide.165 
Therefore, the convenience of marking all children as “male” or “female” at birth 
is simply not worth the disproportionate and devastating consequences imposed 
on the approximately one million trans* people in the United States.166 
Moreover, there are few circumstances in which the government actually 
needs to know one’s gender.167 Gender is irrelevant to the provision of most 
government services. Sex-segregated prison facilities168 and the Selective 
Service System169 are among the few areas where the government posits that 
it cannot relate to individuals on a gender-neutral basis.170 And if the 
government must keep these systems strictly organized by gender, it could 
adopt a rule for them that does not vitiate the agency of trans* people. 
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168 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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the draft. Who Must Register, SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., https://www.sss.gov/Registration-Info/Who-
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B. The Government Must Respect Self-Determined and Self-Expressed Identity 
Regardless, even if the government documents gender, the right of trans* 
people to self-define their gender identity is protected by the Constitution. 
First, self-identification is already an appropriate means of defining 
individual identity, even when government recognition is involved. For 
example, an individual’s response to the race question on the United States 
Census is entirely self-determined.171 A return to nineteenth century “racial 
determination trials”—that determined whether individuals were black or 
white for the purpose of determining whether they were slaves—would be 
impermissible.172 The government recognizes that affirmatively producing 
racial identity is not a legitimate act. 
The government also does not rigidly define sexual orientation. Obergefell 
permits gays and lesbians to marry same-sex partners because their 
“immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to 
this profound commitment.”173 But the Court does not require individuals to 
be only same-sex oriented before they can marry same-sex partners.174 A 
bisexual man can marry a man. In fact, a straight man can marry a man. The 
Court thus allows people to self-define through marriage, but does not 
impose intrusive requirements regarding sexual orientation.175 
States already recognize certain identity-based claims, like adverse 
possession and common law marriage, based on self-declaration and outward 
presentation (i.e., a “performance” of identity).176 To adversely possess property, 
one must live on land in a manner that courts presume an owner would.177 The 
acts cannot be “isolated or infrequent—continual, ritualized repetition is 
required.”178 Similarly, some states recognize common law marriages when 
individuals hold themselves out as married. Rhode Island, for example, 
recognizes common law marriages when the parties seriously intended to 
enter into a marital relationship and their conduct leads the community to 
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view them as married.179 The intent and belief elements “are demonstrated by 
‘inference from cohabitation, declarations, reputation [among the community], and 
other competent circumstantial evidence.’”180 
If the government must, in compelling circumstances, interact with a 
citizen based on gender, it could determine gender through proclaimed 
identity and the “adverse possession” of gender.181 For instance, if the 
individual presents as female in regular, everyday life, she should be regarded 
as female. This would eliminate any risk that a male might claim to be a 
woman merely to avoid the draft or placement in a male prison facility. Of 
course, this determination should defer to the individual’s identity, recognize 
the multiplicity of gender identities, and should not be used to produce and 
ossify male or female gender norms. 
In these frameworks of identity, individuals claim a status by personal 
declaration and “hold[ing] her or himself out to the community” as an owner 
or spouse.182 After all, “these labels are fundamentally about communication 
to the public at large.”183 Gender identity is another identity characteristic, 
like owner or spouse, which can be determined by individual proclamation 
and public presentation. This analogy does not propose that trans* people 
should have to wait years to obtain “adverse possession” or “common law” 
identity. Rather, the comparison to common law marriages and adverse 
possession proves that there are legal avenues to control one’s own identity 
and status—and obtain government recognition—without navigating intrusive 
and demeaning legal requirements. 
Moreover, the government’s respect for self-proclaimed religious beliefs, 
although not entirely analogous given First Amendment religious protections, is 
still informative here. When a claimant for religious liberty comes before a 
court, the government defers to and respects her religious identity. Under the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,184 
a factfinder can evaluate whether a religious practice is sincere, but may not 
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inquire into the truthfulness of religious beliefs.185 The First Amendment 
both “forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the 
practice of any form of worship” and “safeguards the free exercise of the 
chosen form of religion”—even those that are “rank heresy to followers of the 
orthodox faiths.”186 Additionally, since an inquiry into the sincerity of a 
person’s religious beliefs is “purely a subjective question”187 and inherently 
speculative, such inquiries are “handled with a light touch, or ‘judicial 
shyness.’”188 In practice, “[s]incerity is generally presumed or easily established” 
based on the words or actions of the claimant.189 The government should defer 
to people’s sincerely held gender identities—and not investigate or govern 
them—in the same way that it defers to the truthfulness or reasonableness of 
sincerely held religious beliefs. 
Furthermore, courts afford religious claimants protection for their 
sincerely held beliefs despite inconsistent behavior190 and even if “a person 
does not adhere steadfastly to every tenet of his faith.”191 Thus, the 
government should not impose gender markers upon individuals and deny 
them the ability to reclassify their gender or opt out of gender altogether. 
Similarly, the government should not require complete adherence to the 
normative biological traits of another gender as a condition for gender 
reclassification. The government does not require the religious beliefs of 
claimants to adhere to strict orthodoxy or catechism; trans* people should 
similarly be able to define their identity consistent with their own understanding 
of gender, not a normative prescription of gender. 
Finally, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court accepted the 
legitimacy of the petitioners’ claimed religious objection to an insurance mandate 
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that required companies to provide employees with coverage for contraceptives: 
“[I]t is not for us to say that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial. 
Instead, our ‘narrow function . . . in this context is to determine’ whether the line 
drawn reflects ‘an honest conviction.’”192 Trans* people could also benefit from a 
rule under which sincerely held gender identities of “honest conviction” are 
recognized by the government, regardless of whether government officials 
believe those gender identities are “correct.” Ultimately, gender identity, like 
religious identity, must remain with the individual to define and express. 
The deference to religious claimants stands in stark contrast to the lack of 
deference shown to trans* claimants. For example, trans woman Janet Heilig 
Wright was denied the right to change her legal gender despite letters from her 
social worker and doctor affirming her female identity, hormone treatment 
regimen, and hormonal castration.193 The court was unsatisfied with Janet’s claim 
and referred to this “factual evidence” as “rather skimpy.”194 The State would not 
change her legal gender unless she underwent irreversible genital surgery.195 
Moreover, the court continued to use masculine pronouns to refer to Janet, 
explaining, “We do so not to disparage petitioner’s undoubtedly sincere belief 
that his transition is, indeed, complete, but simply to be consistent with our 
conclusion that he has yet to offer sufficient evidence to warrant that 
determination as a legal manner.”196 
The judicial branch also disparaged the gender identity of trans woman 
Ashley Diamond, who was placed in a male prison facility only to be denied 
medical treatment and repeatedly sexually assaulted.197 In the first line of the 
opinion dismissing the defendants’ motions to dismiss her claims, the court 
noted, “Plaintiff Ashley Diamond alleges she is a transgender woman.”198 
Thus, Ashley’s gender identity was apparently only “allege[d].” Moreover, in 
a footnote accompanying “she,” the court explained, “All parties refer to 
Diamond with feminine pronouns. Consequently, the Court does the same. 
This should suggest nothing other than consistency.”199 In doing so, the judge 
vitiated Ashley’s right to identity despite the clear support in the record that 
Ashley had “strongly identified” as female since childhood, expressed herself 
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as female for years, and received feminizing hormone treatment for over 
seventeen years.200 
Finally, the Supreme Court’s description of George and Maxine Maynard 
in Wooley v. Maynard201 evinces the disparity between judicial deference to 
religious identity and judicial scrutiny of gender identity. The first time the 
Maynards are mentioned, Chief Justice Berger, writing for the Court, noted, 
“Appellees George Maynard and his wife Maxine are followers of the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses faith.”202 They did not merely allege to be Jehovah’s 
Witnesses. Similarly, the Court did not refer to them as Jehovah’s Witnesses 
only to maintain consistency with the parties’ opinions of the Maynards’s 
faith. Instead, the Court accepted their sincerely held religious identity as 
proclaimed. Likewise, courts must accept the sincerely held gender identities 
proclaimed by trans* people. 
As a start, maybe trans* people should cover the gender on their legal 
documents with tape like George and Maxine Maynard covered “Live Free 
or Die” on their license plate.203 If the United States Constitution forbids the 
government from forcing George and Maxine to display a state motto that 
conflicts with their sincerely held beliefs, then it should forbid the government 
from forcing trans* people to display gender markers on their driver’s licenses 
that conflict with their sincerely held beliefs. 
CONCLUSION 
The government should not impose gender markers on legal documents, 
inspect the veracity of trans* people’s gender identity, or condition changes 
of legal identity on invasive surgery requirements. These acts impermissibly 
occupy the lives of trans* people and compel identity. Restrictions or bans on 
gender reclassification do not simply constrain one liberty or remove one 
freedom; instead, they place unconstitutional conditions on the right to 
identity, affirmatively affect trans* people’s life chances, use trans* people’s 
bodies to buttress normative gender conceptions, and deny trans* people’s 
sincerely held identities. 
The imposition of gender identity inverts the typical constitutional 
relationship between the individual and the State. Under the Constitution, the 
individual self-regulates and self-governs regarding matters of personhood and 
identity, and the State restricts or regulates particular liberties to promote 
ordered liberty and justice. But the imposition of gender identity posits the State 
as having full control over the individual’s body, life, and identity. The government 
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and its rule matrix do not provide ordered liberty or justice for trans* people; the 
government actually denies trans* people their constitutional right to identity. 
Ultimately, the Constitution proscribes totalitarianism. The State cannot 
enforce or compel identity, appropriate or conscript people into the service 
of the State’s normative, ideological goals, or restrict one’s ability to engage 
in essential, self-defining acts. Any such restriction “do[es] violence to both 
letter and spirit of the Constitution.”204 For trans* people and the Constitution 
alike, we must eliminate totalitarian gender identity laws. 
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